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under Noise Eliminates Perverse
Punishment But Does Not Increase
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We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect
and imperfect information in a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. Under
perfect and extremely noisy information, aggregate behavior does not differ between
institutions. Under intermediate noise, punishment escalates in the decentralized
peer-to-peer punishment regime which badly affects efficiency while sustaining
cooperation for longer. Only decentralized punishment is often directed at cooperators
(perverse punishment). We report several, sometimes subtle, differences in punishment
behavior, and how contributions react.
Keywords: cooperation, public good, centralized punishment, imperfect information, anti-social punishment,
perverse punishment
1. INTRODUCTION
Modern societies have centralized sanctioning power as a means to enforce norms (Weber, 1919).
This monopoly has often been justified on the premise that private, decentralized enforcement has
(higher) negative externalities (Clotfelter, 1978; Polinsky, 1980). But, is centralization necessarily
better? Experiments on voluntary cooperation repeatedly demonstrate that, compared to an
environment without punishment, decentralized, informal, peer-to-peer punishment increases
cooperation under perfect information (Yamagishi, 1986; Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gächter,
2000, 2002), and welfare in the long run (Gächter et al., 2008). Various studies, however, challenge
the idea that peer-to-peer punishment generally enhances cooperation (for an overview, see
Nikiforakis, 2014): for example on the basis of punishment which is targeted at cooperators,
referred to as anti-social (Herrmann et al., 2008) or perverse punishment (Cinyabuguma et al.,
2006), or on the basis of counter-punishment (targeted either at the group or the punisher
directly as in Nikiforakis, 2008; Nikiforakis et al., 2012)1. If punishment is centralized, however,
there is no opportunity for counter punishment and such sources of inefficiency are less likely.
Furthermore, with only one punisher, there are no coordination problems and no problems
resulting from possibly conflicting contribution norms. Some experiments test the effectiveness
of formal, centralized enforcement mechanisms compared to informal, decentralized regimes,
while capturing important aspects of institutions. This literature characterizes centralization as a
mechanism that allows to commit to a sanctioning scheme, such that punishment is automatically
carried out and/or determined according to some exogenous voting rule (Kosfeld and Riedl, 2004;
Tyran and Feld, 2006; Guillen et al., 2007; Kube and Traxler, 2011; Putterman et al., 2011; Andreoni
and Gee, 2012; Ambrus and Greiner, 2015). Centralization is viewed as a commitment mechanism
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and these papers do not explore the effect of centralization per se,
i.e., of merely concentrating all power into one hand.
In an environment with a centralized punisher rather than
an automated mechanism, an important question is how the
authorization to punish is granted. Baldassarri and Grossman
(2011) compare two centralized punishment regimes. In one,
authority is granted by chance, in the other by electing the
punisher from within the group after two trial rounds. While
punishment behavior is very similar, in the elected authority
treatment participants cooperate more. This suggests that in
order to test whether centralization per se matters, one needs
to abstract from any mechanism that grants legitimacy, and
restrict the analysis to a fair random selection. There are a few
studies which allow to compare a centralized with a decentralized
punishment regime in this way, and the resulting evidence
is mixed. In Carpenter et al. (2012), where the role of the
punisher is randomly allocated but fixed and punishment is
cheap, contributions and overall efficiency are larger in the
decentralized regime. Similarly, in Nosenzo and Sefton (2014)
contributions are substantially larger in a mutual punishment
regime than in a centralized one. In O’Gorman et al. (2009), on
the other hand, where authority is also granted at random but
changes every round, and where punishment is expensive, there
are no significant differences in cooperation. However, due to
significantly more punishment, the decentralized regime is less
efficient.
One conclusion from these studies is that the effectiveness
of a centralized regime stands and falls with the ability and
willingness of just one person to invest resources for punishment,
which results in considerably more variability in performance
between groups. Decentralized regimes, on the other hand, suffer
from the problems already mentioned. Such negative effects
are likely to be aggravated by noisy information, which so far
was only tested in decentralized regimes. Several studies show
that peer to peer punishment is not able to sustain cooperation
under imperfect information (Grechenig et al., 2010; Ambrus
and Greiner, 2012; Grechenig et al., 2015) and it remains
unclear whether this equally holds for centralized punishment.
For example, imperfect information may result in some to
stop punishing altogether, even irrespective of total group
contributions. While in a decentralized regime this could partly
be compensated by more punishment of others, if punishment is
centralized, this is not possible.
In order to test the effect of centralization per se under
different degrees of imperfect information, we hold all other
considerations constant across institutions: (1y, (1) punishers
cannot commit to punishment ex ante, (2) contributors cannot
influence who is allowed to punish, (3) the direct consequences
from punishment are the same in both institutions, and (4)
there are no differences in externalities from punishment. We
introduce noise in the signals about individual contributions in
order to test whether decentralized or centralized punishment
is more robust to imperfect information. By abstracting from
1Anti-social punishment is directed at someone who contributedmore than oneself
(see e.g., Herrmann et al., 2008), perverse punishment at someone who contributed
more than the group average in a symmetric setting (see e.g., Cinyabuguma et al.,
2006).
institutional factors, we return to the origins of formal
punishment as a centralization of informal sanctioning regimes
(Turnbull, 1962; Guala, 2012). Furthermore, by allowing
participants to interact over 30 periods, we obtain enough
observations for a detailed analysis of individual behavior and
group dynamics.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze the
effects of centralization of punishment per se under imperfect
information.
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We use a standard finitely repeated linear public-good game
with a voluntary contribution mechanism. Participants interact
in groups of five over 30 periods in a partner design, where every
period has two stages, a contribution and a punishment stage.
In our set of experiments we have two treatments. In the first
we compare two different punishment institutions: Decentralized
(DEC) and Centralized punishment (CEN). In the second we
control for the accuracy of the signal about the contributions in
the group. More specifically, we compare a perfect signal with
three different levels of noise, indicated by the probability λ of
an accurate signal with λ = 1, λ = 0.75, or λ = 0.50. Thus,
the signal is either always accurate, or only 75 or 50% of the
time. In the following we identify a treatment condition by the
combination of institution and λ. For example DEC/1 is the
treatment with decentralized punishment and a perfect signal.
There are five participants in every group, four C-participants
(i ∈ {1 . . . 4}) and one Authority (A), and every period
consists of two stages, a contribution and a punishment
stage. In the first stage, the contribution stage, the four C-
participants can contribute to the public good; the remaining
participant, the Authority (A), benefits from the public good
but cannot contribute herself. After the contribution stage,
all five participants first receive a common signal about
the contributions, where the quality of the signal depends
on λ. Then, in treatments with centralized punishment
(CEN) the authority decides over punishment. In treatments
with decentralized punishment (DEC) this is done by the
C-participants and the Authority is merely passive. More
specifically, she cannot influence punishment but is, nevertheless,
affected by the contribution and punishment decisions of the four
C-participants. In the following we describe each stage in more
detail2.
2.1. Contribution Stage
In the first stage of each of the 30 rounds, each of the four C-
participants receives an endowment of eg = 20 tokens. They then
simultaneously and independently determine their contribution
to the public good gi with gi ∈ G = {0, 2, 4, ..., 20}
In line withmost experiments on decentralized punishment in
public good games, we chose a marginal per capita return of 0.4.
Hence, the monetary payoff of player i in the first stage is given by
2 We will use the female genus for the authority and the male genus for the C-
participants. The experiments, however, did not control for sex, and no loaded
language was used.
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π1i = eg − gi + 0.4
∑
k
gk (1)
The authority A, despite not contributing, equally benefits from
the public good:
π1A = 0.4
∑
k
gk (2)
2.2. Punishment Stage
In the second stage, every C-participant i and authority A
receives the same signal sk about the contributions gk of
participant k with k 6= i. The signal itself is independently
determined for every contribution in the group. With probability
λ the signal is correct and sk = gk, with probability 1 − p the
signal is incorrect. An incorrect signal is taken from the uniform
distribution of all possible contributions excluding the actual
one. More specifically,
sk =
{
gk with probability= λ
g˜k with probability= 1− λ
,
where λ is the accuracy of the signal and g˜k is an independent
realization out of the uniform distribution G \
{
gk
}
. As all
participants receive the same signals about contributions of
others, information conditions for punishers are constant across
treatments. Note, however, that every C-participant always
knows for sure howmuch he contributed himself but they do not
know which signal others receive about their own contribution3.
C-participants were identified by numbers 1–4 which were
assigned randomly anew every period and made identification of
group members difficult. We contrast a perfect signal (λ = 1)
with three levels of noise: λ = 0.5 and λ = 0.75. For example, for
λ = 0.5, a contribution of 6 would lead to the signal “6” with
probability 0.5, and to any other signal, each with probability
0.05 (0.5/10). Thus, despite considerable noise, a signal is still
informative.
2.2.1. Punishment
In both punishment institutions, each of the four C-participants
i receives a punishment endowment of ep = 10 punishment
points, and authority A receives an additional endowment of
eAp = 40. Otherwise the rules differ.
2.2.2. Punishment in DEC
InDEC the four C-participants can distribute punishment points
amongst each other, where each point costs them one unit and
also reduces the authority’s income by one4. Every received
punishment point reduces the target participant’s income by
three units. More specifically, denoting a punishment point sent
by i to j with pij, the total payoff of participant i is:
πi = π
1
i + ep −
∑
j
pij − 3
∑
j
pji , (3)
3 Note that due to external validity we decided to keep this informational
asymmetry which is a natural feature of these institutions.
4 The authority’s income is reduced by one to guarantee symmetry with treatment
CEN.
and the payoff of participant A is:
πA = π
1
A + e
A
p −
∑
i
∑
j 6= i
pij (4)
We include the authority A in treatment DEC as a passive
participant in order to hold considerations, such as the
externalities from punishment (see Engel and Rockenbach, 2009),
constant across treatments.
2.2.3. Punishment in CEN
In CEN, only authority A can distribute punishment points.
Every punishment point distributed by A reduces A’s payoff
by one, the punished subject’s payoff by three, and the payoff
of each other participant by 1/3. This keeps the overall costs
of punishment constant across treatments (participants finance
the punishment applied by A, except one’s own punishment).
Furthermore, we kept the maximal amount of punishment
points that could be assigned to one participant constant across
treatments by limiting A to distributing at most 30 points to one
individual. Thus, in CEN, final payoffs are determined as follows:
πi = π
1
i + ep −
1
3
∑
j 6= i
pAj − 3pAi , (5)
and
πA = π
1
A + e
A
p −
∑
j
pAj , (6)
where equivalently to pij we denote with pAj the number of
punishment points assigned to j by A. This payoff structure keeps
everything constant across institutions, including externalities,
efficiency concerns, commitment, and punishment power, such
that we exclusively explore the effect of centralization per se.
2.2.4. Information at the End of One Round
At the end of a round, every participant is informed about
his income from the public good, the amount of punishment
received, and his final total payoff. Thus, any inaccurate
perception about one’s own income, resulting from noisy signals
about group contributions, are resolved at the end of every round.
2.3. Equilibrium
To find the set of equilibria under the assumptions of selfishness,
common knowledge of rationality and sequential rationality,
we first look at the stage game. As punishment is costly, it is
strictly dominated, both for A in CEN, as well as for the regular
participants inDEC. Thus, play at the contribution stage remains
unaffected and zero contribution by all remains the unique
equilibrium in dominant strategies. As zero contribution and no
punishment guarantees the minmax payoff, the equilibrium is
not affected by the finite number of repetitions, and there should
be no cooperation and no punishment throughout the 30 periods.
This rationale applies to all treatments, such that there should
be no differences between different punishment institutions and
different levels of noise.
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2.4. Setup
We use a 2×3 factorial design between subjects, i.e., every subject
participates in only one of our six treatment combinations.
Subjects interact repeatedly over 30 periods in a partners design,
i.e., groups are kept constant. All rounds are paid.
The experiments were run in the experimental laboratory of
the University of Bonn (EconLab) and was programmed and
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We
ran a total of 12 sessions with 240 (20 per session) student
participants (mostly undergraduate from various fields of study)
divided into 48 groups (8 groups of 5 participants per treatment),
and no participant took part in more than one session. We relied
on ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) for recruitment.
For 100 experimental Taler participants earned e1. Sessions
lasted for about 90 min (including admission and payment) and
participants earned on average e14.28 (including a show up fee
of e2.50), about USD 18.80, which is more than the usual hourly
wage for student jobs.
3. RESULTS
We first report aggregate results with respect to institutions
and noise before we analyze punishment behavior, the resulting
incentives, and intertemporal reactions in more detail.
3.1. Aggregate Outcomes
We compare contributions, overall punishment, and efficiency
between institutions and noise levels. The graphs in Figure 1
show average contributions, punishment points (distributed
to C-participants), and efficiency over time across treatment
combinations. Efficiency is measured as the difference between
total earnings minus fixed endowments (for contribution and
punishment stage), including authorities. Thus, an efficiency of
0 means that inefficiencies due to punishment balance out gains
from cooperation.
3.1.1. Differences between Institutions
Table 1 reports the p-values of two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum
tests comparing the distributions of matching group averages
between DEC and CEN within each noise condition (see
rows)5. For each variable of interest, contributions, punishment
points, and total efficiency, we test separately for the first (Periods
1–15) and second half (Periods 16–30) of the experiment (see
columns) and rely on acceptance thresholds of 10%.
For a perfect signal, i.e., whenever λ = 1 there are neither
significant differences in contributions nor in punishment or
efficiency. Similarly, for considerable noise of λ = 0.50 Table 1
does not report any significant differences between institutions.
For λ = 0.75, however, we find significant differences
between institutions. In the second half of the experiment
contributions are significantly higher in DEC/0.75 than in
CEN/0.75. Furthermore, there is significantly more punishment
in DEC than in CEN in the first half of the experiment, but
not in the second half. The substantially higher punishment in
DEC/0.75 in the first half, and here especially in the first ten
5 More specifically, we take the average for every matching group and compare the
resulting distributions.
FIGURE 1 | Outcomes. Treatments with DECentralized or CENtralized
punishment and a probability of a correct signal about individual contributions
of 1, 0.75, or 0.50.
periods, results in significantly lower efficiency than in CEN/0.75.
Despite contributions being higher in late rounds, there are no
significant differences in efficiency. If instead of total efficiency
we only look at Profits of C-participants, results are very similar
and qualitatively identical for all levels of λ.
Result 1. If signals are perfect (λ = 1) or highly distorted
(λ = 0.5) aggregate outcomes do not differ significantly between
institutions. For λ = 0.75 there is significantly more punishment
and less efficiency in DEC early in the experiment, and in later
periods contributions remain significantly higher in DEC/0.75 than
in CEN/0.75.
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TABLE 1 | Aggregate effects of institution.
Contrib. Punishment Efficiency
Periods: 1–15 16–30 1–15 16–30 1–15 16-30
λ = 1 0.752 0.709 0.713 0.594 0.834 0.709
λ = 0.75 0.753 0.046 0.027 0.462 0.142 0.142
λ = 0.50 0.495 0.674 0.793 0.400 0.753 0.529
Each cell reports the p−value of a Wilcoxon rank-sum test comparing the distributions of
averages per matching group between CEN and DEC for a given λ (row). Averages per
matching group are either taken over first or last 15 periods. Significant outcomes with
p < 0.1 are highlighted.
Most contributions in CEN/1 and DEC/1 are close to
the ceiling of 20. In Section A.2. (Supplementary Material)
of the online supplement we report simulations which show
that despite of this we could have observed significant
effects, if in DEC/1 a sufficient number of participants
had contributed fully by default. For example, suppose that
participants in DEC/1 had contributed fully with a baseline
chance of 70 or 80%. In this case we could have found
a significant difference between DEC/1 and CEN/1 at the
5% significance level with a probability of 52.3 and 94.6%,
respectively.
3.1.2. Effect of Noise
Comparisons between different levels of noise within each
institution mirror our previous results. Table 2 lists the p-
values of Wilcoxon rank sum tests comparing outcomes between
different levels of noise within each institution. Again we
distinguish between the first and second half of the experiment
(see columns).
In CEN contributions are always significantly smaller the
more noisy the signal. In DEC, however, there are no significant
differences between λ = 1 and λ = 0.75 in the first half of the
experiment, while otherwise comparative statics are as in CEN.
Aggregate Punishment, on the other hand remains unaffected by
noise in CEN in the first half, but not in the second, where it is
smaller in CEN/1 than in CEN/0.75 and CEN/0.50. In DEC only
λ = 0.75 stands out. While punishment never differs between
DEC/1 and DEC/0.50, there is significantly more punishment in
DEC/0.75 than in in either DEC/1 or DEC/0.50 in the first half
and significantly more than in DEC/1 also in the second half. In
both institutions, efficiency is similarly affected by noise in the
first half of the experiment. It is significantly higher for λ = 1
than for λ = 0.75 or λ = 0.50. While there are no significant
differences between CEN/0.75 and CEN/0.50 throughout the
experiment, efficiency is significantly higher for DEC/0.75 than
for DEC/0.50 in the second half, a consequence of the higher
contributions towards the end of DEC/0.75. In summary we find
an interaction effect between institution and noise:
Result 2. Irrespective of institution, noise has a negative effect on
contributions in the long run. The effect of noise on punishment
and efficiency, however, is non-monotonic and differs between
institutions. Under centralized punishment CEN/1 stands out with
significantly less punishment and higher efficiency in the long run,
TABLE 2 | Aggregate effects of noise.
DEC CEN
Periods: 1–15 16–30 1–15 16–30
Contributions
λ = 1 vs. 0.75 0.208 0.059 0.092 0.010
λ = 1 vs. 0.50 0.009 0.012 0.021 0.002
λ = 0.75 vs. 0.5 0.059 0.002 0.059 0.074
Punishment
λ = 1 vs. 0.75 0.046 0.016 0.401 0.026
λ = 1 vs. 0.50 1.00 0.342 0.916 0.023
λ = 0.75 vs. 0.5 0.021 0.103 0.431 0.916
Efficiency
λ = 1 vs. 0.75 0.059 0.074 0.074 0.003
λ = 1 vs. 0.50 0.059 0.021 0.016 0.002
λ = 0.75 vs. 0.5 0.600 0.005 0.401 0.294
Each cell reports the p−value of a Wilcoxon rank-sum test comparing distributions of
averages per matching group between different levels of noise within an institution.
Averages per matching group are either taken over first or last 15 periods. Significant
outcomes with p < 0.1 are in bold.
while there are hardly any differences between CEN/0.75 and
CEN/0.50. Under decentralized punishment, DEC/0.75 stands out
withmore punishment and less efficiency especially in early rounds.
3.2. Distributed Punishment
We turn to regression analysis to identify how the decision
to punish is correlated to signals about contributions. The
columns in Table 3 report the results of estimations of the
distributed amount of punishment points on characteristics
of the received signals, separately for every treatment6.
Variable DFree is a dummy variable indicating a signal of
no contribution. Variables DaboveGroup and DbelowGroup
are dummy variables indicating that, according to the signal,
the receiver of punishment has contributed more than the
group average and less, respectively. In CEN we calculate the
average group contribution as the average signal. In DEC we
take the average over one’s own contribution and the signals
about the contributions of the other three. Similarly, variables
Dmore and Dless in treatment DEC are dummy variables
indicating that, according to the signal, the (potential) receiver of
punishment contributed more than the one who decides whether
to punish and less, respectively. The definitions of Dmore, Dless,
DaboveGroup, and DbelowGroup all exclude the case of no
difference (avoiding perfect collinearity)7. Our measurement of
cooperativeness as the deviation to the group average is similar to,
for example, (Cinyabuguma et al., 2006). The measures based on
6Whenever we speak of a “signal,” we are referring to the number the punisher sees
on her screen about the contribution of the other participant.
7 Thus, in CEN the constant of the regression measures average punishment of
someone who contributed exactly as much as the group average. Similarly, in DEC
it measures the punishment of someone whose contribution does not only match
the group average but also equals the contribution of the participant who decides
whether to punish.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 5 September 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 180
Fischer et al. Monopolizing Punishment
TABLE 3 | Distributed punishment.
λ = 1 λ = 0.75 λ = 0.50
DEC CEN DEC CEN DEC CEN
DISTRIBUTED PUNISHMENT POINTS
Signal −0.0333 ≫ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.0731∗∗∗ ≫ −0.105∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗ ≪ −0.0511
(−0.48) (−11.73) (−3.36) (−6.13) (−4.83) (−0.72)
DFreerider 0.792∗∗ ≫ −0.110 0.0223 < 0.256 0.134 ≺ 0.494
(2.54) (−0.29) (0.09) (0.73) (0.78) (1.41)
DbelowGroup 2.141∗∗∗ ≪ 3.104∗∗∗ 1.191∗∗∗ 1.029 0.699∗ < 1.400
(3.12) (5.13) (5.68) (1.30) (1.96) (1.38)
daboveGroup 1.653∗∗∗ > 0.503 0.168 0.117 0.496∗∗ < 1.468
(2.89) (0.62) (0.71) (0.17) (2.06) (1.52)
Dless 2.056∗∗∗ 1.792∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗
(5.39) (8.63) (2.92)
Dmore 1.689∗∗∗ 1.297∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗
(4.01) (6.96) (5.92)
Period 0.138 < 0.478∗∗∗ 0.281 < 0.437∗ −0.206 ≫ −0.772
(0.43) (3.21) (1.28) (1.85) (−0.88) (−1.43)
_cons −5.080∗∗∗ ≪ −1.843∗∗ −3.316∗∗∗ ≪ −1.116 −2.643∗∗∗ −0.260
(−8.93) (−2.16) (−5.15) (−0.96) (−3.55) (−0.15)
N (#Groups) 2880 (8) 960 (8) 2880 (8) 960 (8) 2880 (8) 960 (8)
ll −935.8 −393.7 −1940.2 −1137.1 −1141.8 −1078.8
Wald chi2 645.0∗∗∗ 954.5∗∗∗ 1333.3∗∗∗ 946.0∗∗∗ 513.5∗∗∗ 385.0∗∗∗
Poisson regression of distributed punishment points with random shift effect on matching group and subject (DEC only, random effects independent). Not reported: fixed effect on every
Period (following Period 2). t statistics in parentheses based on Huber White standard errors (not for Wald chi2). ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Significance of differences between
institutions (based on regression of data on both institutions, including dummy for treatment CEN and interaction effects): ≺ (p < 0.1), < (p < 0.05),≪ (p < 0.01).
individual comparisons in DEC are as in Herrmann et al. (2008).
Clearly, both measures are related8.
All regressions are maximum likelihood Poisson estimations
which besides the above mentioned fixed effects have a random
intercept effect per matching group, and in DEC also per
participant (independent of group effect). Estimations also
include fixed effects for periods (following period 2). We
use Poisson estimations as this best controls for the skewed
distribution of integer punishment points.
While in DEC patterns of punishment decisions are similar
for all levels of λ, in CEN punishment becomes fairly undirected
with increasing noise. In all treatment combinations, punishment
decreases with increasing Signal about the contribution. Only
in DEC/1 and CEN/0.50 this is not significant. Of all treatment
combinations, only DEC/1 has significant additional punishment
of free rider behavior (DFreerider). In all treatments someone
gets punished more when the signal about his contribution is
below the group average (DbelowGroup), an effect which is
significant in all treatments except CEN/0.75 and CEN/0.50.
Similarly, participants who contribute less than the punisher
(Dless) in DEC are punished significantly more.
In DEC/1 and DEC/0.50 we furthermore find significant
perverse punishment as measured by DaboveGroup, an effect
8 Furthermore, as Steiner (2007) shows, a punishment rule exclusively targeting
the lowest contributor can establish cooperation even if punishment sentiments
are very small. It is therefore reasonable to measure cooperativeness in relation to
average group contributions.
which is absent in all CEN treatments. Furthermore, in all
DEC treatments there is significant anti-social punishment as
indicated by Dmore.
Result 3. Distributed punishment
• becomes less systematic with increasing noise in CEN,
• and decreases with increasing signal in all treatments.
• There is perverse punishment in DEC/1 and DEC/0.5 but in
none of the CEN treatments.
• There is anti-social punishment in DEC for all levels of λ.
We furthermore tested whether there are different patterns
in punishment behavior between the first 10, 15, last 15,
and last 20 periods, especially in DEC/0.75. While there are
some minor differences in the size of reactions, the overall
patterns are similar. We furthermore tested whether differences
in coefficients between, for example DEC/1 and CEN/1 are
significant9. Significant differences are indicated by symbols such
as ≻ (p < 0.1), > (p < 0.05), or≫ (p < 0.01) between the two
columns.
Result 4. With only a few exceptions, punishment behavior differs
significantly between institutions.
9 For this purpose we introduced a dummy variable for institution DEC and
interacted it with all variables before running a regression on the combined date
for both institutions within one noise treatment.
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TABLE 4 | Received punishment.
λ = 1 λ = 0.75 λ = 0.50
DEC CEN DEC CEN DEC CEN
DEDUCTED INCOME
Contribution −0.0385 ≫ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.0360∗∗ ≪ 0.00296 −0.0616∗∗∗ ≪ −0.0193
(−0.61) (−5.71) (−2.28) (0.17) (−5.21) (−0.63)
DFreerider 0.904∗∗∗ ≫ 0.139 −0.117 ≪ 1.083∗∗∗ 0.281∗ 0.446
(2.80) (0.33) (−0.46) (5.73) (1.70) (1.32)
DbelowGroup 3.511∗∗∗ ≫ 2.871∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗ 0.597∗∗ −0.196 < 0.408∗∗
(5.98) (4.58) (2.28) (2.23) (-0.22) (2.45)
DaboveGroup 2.852∗∗∗ ≫ 0.604 −0.103 −0.111 0.0945 0.268
(7.02) (0.70) (−0.42) (−0.49) (0.12) (0.98)
Period 0.035 ≫ 0.00272 0.0106 −0.0171 −0.067 ≫ −0.116∗∗∗
(0.62) (0.19) (0.53) (−0.40) (−1.64) (−3.03)
_cons −2.172∗∗ ≪ −0.023 1.734∗∗∗ ≫ 0.045 1.01 0.727
(−2.29) (−0.02) (4.96) (0.09) (0.87) (1.22)
N (#Groups) 960 (8) 960 (8) 960 (8) 960 (8) 960 (8) 960 (8)
Wald chi2 1325.2∗∗∗ 2154.5∗∗∗ 1594.7∗∗∗ 1634.1∗∗∗ 607.7∗∗∗ 787.8∗∗∗
ll −1381.3 −806.9 −4785.8 −3521.4 −2090.1 −2789.4
Poisson regression of deducted income with random shift effect on subject (DEC only) and matching group (independent). Not reported: fixed effect on every Period (following Period
2). t statistics in parentheses based on Huber White standard errors (not for Wald chi2). ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Significance of differences between institutions (based on
regression of data on both institutions, including dummy for treatment CEN and interaction effects): ≺ (p < 0.1), < (p < 0.05),≪ (p < 0.01).
Finally, which effect is stronger, punishment of negative
or positive deviators?10. With the exception of DEC/0.50,
punishment of negative deviators is stronger. Wald tests
comparing coefficientsDbelow withDabove orDless withDmore
confirm that these differences are significant in treatments with
λ = 1 or λ = 0.75 (all p-values below 0.0451), but not for
λ = 0.50 (p ≥ 0.2073)
Result 5. Except for treatment combinations with λ = 0.50,
punishment of negative deviators is significantly stronger than that
of positive deviators.
3.3. Incentives
To adequately compare institutions we must compare how
punishment is being experienced. In treatment DEC recipients of
punishment can not identify individual punishers and therefore
whether the punisher contributed more or less. Thus, contrary to
distributed punishment,Dmore andDless are now undetermined
in both institutions, which puts the two back on equal footing.
Furthermore, for DEC it is conceivable that due to the many
repetitions, behavior of “sophisticated” punishers may add a non-
random component to how distributed punishment is aggregated
in the group11. So, while in CEN received punishment must be
equivalent to the way punishment is distributed, in DEC received
punishment may be more than just a combination of distributed
punishment with white noise.
10 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis.
11 Although, very difficult to achieve, there could be some form of “tacit” collusion
amongst punishers, and participants may learn to identify the accuracy of signals,
for example based on repetitive or unique contribution behavior.
Table 4 reports results of Poisson regressions of the received
punishment on various characteristics of a participant’s
contribution. All regressors are now based on actual
contributions rather than signals. This includes the definition
of the group average for the calculation of DaboveGroup and
DbelowGroup.
For perfect signals our estimations by and large confirm
our previous results12. Again we find significant punishment
of negative deviators in both CEN/1 and DEC/1, and of
positive deviators (DaboveGroup) in DEC/1 only. Contrary to
our previous results, neither in DEC/0.75 nor in DEC/0.50 do
participants experience significant perverse punishment. Despite
the noise, in all treatments except for DEC/0.50, negative
deviators receive significantly more punishment. Finally, there
is no experience of perverse punishment in any of the CEN
treatments.
Result 6. • In DEC/1 negative and positive deviators experience
punishment.
• In DEC/0.75 only negative deviators experience punishment.
• In DEC/0.50 received punishment is independent of how one’s
contribution relates to those in the group.
• In all CEN treatments negative deviators experience
significantly more punishment while positive deviators do
not.
Again we compared coefficients between institutions. Significant
results are indicated by symbols such as > between columns in
12It might be surprising that coefficients for CEN/1 in Tables 3, 4 differ. However,
in the former, observations are clustered on the authority, compared to the
recipient of punishment in the latter.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 7 September 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 180
Fischer et al. Monopolizing Punishment
Table 4. Similarly to our results on distributed punishment we
find:
Result 7. With only a few exceptions, experienced punishment
differs significantly between institutions.
In addition to the regressions reported in Table 4 we
ran estimations including variables above and below which
measure the absolute distance of the contribution to the group
average (rather than merely indicator variables DaboveGroup
and DbelowGroup). We report detailed results in the online
supplement. The barplots in Figure 2 illustrate the average
amount of punishment participants received conditioned on how
much their contribution deviated from the group average. The
height of the bars indicate the average punishment, and the width
is proportional to the number of observations in that category.
Our main finding is that only in DEC/1, DEC/0.75, and CEN/1
the size of punishment is overall positively correlated to the
absolute size of the deviation from the group average. There is,
however, one important difference between treatments DEC and
CEN. In the former this overall correlation is driven by a strong
partial effect on the deviation, whereas in CEN it is driven by a
strong reaction to the absolute size of the contribution.
FIGURE 2 | Received punishment. Barplot of average deducted income by
difference between own contribution and average group contribution. Except
for 0, categories show intervals of length 2: “−16 to −14”, “−14 to 12” ... “−2
to < 0”, “0”, “> 0–2”, ...“14–16”. Width of bars is proportional to number of
observations.
3.4. Reaction to Punishment
Table 5 reports the result of three linear regressions of changes
in contributions (contributiont-contributiont−1) on outcomes
in the previous round - one regression each for every level of
noise. More specifically, the first estimation (first two columns)
includes data from λ = 1 treatments only, and we estimated
the average change in contributions for DEC and CEN for six
possible outcomes in the previous round. The outcomes in the
previous round are identified by (i) whether the participant
contributed more than the group average (above), the same
amount (equal), or less (below), and (ii) whether she was
punished or not. Every regressor is a dummy variable indicating
the relevant combination and all calculations are based on actual
contributions rather than signals. The maximum likelihood
estimations correct for random effects on participants and
group13. For example, in DEC/1 someone who in the previous
period contributed more than the group mean, on average
reduces the contribution by 1.025 if there was no punishment
and by 1.505 if there was. The table also reports results from one
sided Wald tests comparing reactions between institutions (DEC
vs. CEN, significance indicated, e.g., by> or≪) as well as testing
for a significant positive effect of punishment on reactions (for
example, define δ = “below & punished”-“below & not pun,”
then we test H0: δ = 0 vs. H1: δ > 0. Significance is indicated
by, e.g.,△).
In both institutions and for all levels of noise, those who
in the previous round contributed less, on average significantly
increase their contribution, irrespective of whether they were
punished or not. In all treatments except CEN/0.5, punishment
significantly enhances this reaction. Those who contributed
more and were not punished decrease their contributions
in all treatment combinations. In DEC, punishment of such
cooperative participants has no significant effect on this reaction.
In CEN, however, such perverse punishment dampens the
reduction, significantly so in CEN/1 and CEN/0.75. Comparing
immediate reactions between institutions, treatments CEN/1 and
CEN/0.75 in most cases show significantly more cooperative
changes in contributions than the equivalent DEC treatments.
Note, however, that there are other reactions that span over more
periods.
In Table A.5 (Supplementary Material) of the online
supplement we report results from similar regressions including
the amount of the received punishment for each of the three
possible cases (above or below average or equal contribution).
Including the amount of the received punishment into the
regression increases the shift effect (or “intercept”) throughout,
and with only one exception (equal contributors in DEC/1),
the reaction to the amount of punishment is negative. For
those contributing below average it is significantly negative
in all treatments except for CEN/0.75, and for above average
contributors it is significantly negative in all except for DEC/0.50
and CEN/0.50.
13 More specifically, reported reactions are the fixed effects from linear maximum
likelihood estimations including independent random effects on participants
nested in random effects on matching groups. As in Table 4, variables are defined
by actual contributions rather than signals.
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TABLE 5 | Change in contributions.
λ = 1 λ = 0.75 λ = 0.50
DEC CEN DEC CEN DEC CEN
CHANGE IN CONTRIBUTION
D below & not pun. 1.146∗∗ < 2.630∗∗∗ 1.220∗∗ < 2.734∗∗∗ 1.966∗∗∗ 2.623∗∗∗
(2.15) (5.03) (2.41) (6.26) (4.61) (6.25)
△ △ △ △ ∧
D below & punished 3.681∗∗∗ < 4.968∗∗∗ 3.260∗∗∗ ≪ 4.956∗∗∗ 3.067∗∗∗ 2.587∗∗∗
(9.45) (12.31) (7.54) (10.22) (6.01) (4.89)
D equal & not pun. −0.394∗ −0.498∗∗ −0.711 −0.54 −0.32 1.063
(−1.68) (−2.05) (−1.29) (−0.79) (−0.28) (1.45)
uprise uprise uprise
D equal & punished 0.9 ≻ −0.853 −0.947 −2.699∗∗ 3.053 2.825∗∗∗
(0.93) (−1.01) (−1.02) (−2.02) (1.02) (3.34)
D above & not pun. −1.025∗∗∗ −1.266∗∗∗ −1.900∗∗∗ ≫ −3.461∗∗∗ −3.286∗∗∗ −3.937∗∗∗
(−2.72) (−4.22) (−4.77) (−9.8) (−8.07) (−9.62)
△ △ ∧
D above & punished −1.505∗∗∗ ≪ 1.812 −1.734∗∗∗ −1.714∗∗ −2.095∗∗∗ > −3.943∗∗∗
(−3.19) (1.61) (−3.4) (−2.39) (−3.46) (−5.54)
N/Subj./Groups 1856/64/16 1856/64/16 1856/64/16
chi2 397.1∗∗∗ 438.7∗∗∗ 448.9∗∗∗
ll −5053.7 −5716.8 −5702.7
Fixed effects margins (t-statistics) from linear maximum likelihood regression with random effect on participant nested in (independent) random effect on matching group. ∗p < 0.1,
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Significance of differences between institutions (based on Wald test, one-sided): ≺ (p < 0.1), < (p < 0.05),≪ (p < 0.01). Significance of effect of punishment
(based on Wald test, one-sided): uprise(p < 0.1), ∧ (p < 0.05), ∆ (p < 0.01).
Result 8. For negative deviators we find:
- Negative deviators increase their contribution in the next period
in both institutions.
- This effect is stronger if they were punished and punishment was
not too high.
- A large amount of punishment has a negative effect on
contributions.
- These immediate reactions are stronger in CEN than in DEC.
For positive deviators we find:
- Positive deviators decrease their contribution in the next period.
- In DEC punishment has no effect.
- In CEN punishment tends to reduce this adjustment.
- However, a lot of punishment has a negative effect on
contributions in DEC and CEN.
We furthermore tested whether reactions to punishment differ
in early rounds. By and large results are similar and do
not differ significantly from the one we reported. The most
noteworthy (though insignificant) difference is that in CEN/1
in early rounds, the positive reaction of cooperative types
to punishment is much smaller and only later becomes
significant.
Finally, to fully assess the question whether punishment has
a stronger effect on contribution behavior in DEC or CEN,
we compare the change in contribution due to punishment
on top of the change in contribution without punishment14.
More specifically, in both institutions deviators change their
contribution even if they are not punished. The effectiveness
of punishment is therefore the difference in adjustments. For
example, define by 1b (DEC/1) the following differences in
coefficients from Table 5. 1b = (below & punished)-(below &
not pun.). We compared these differences between institutions
by testing for example H0 : 1b (DEC/1) = 1b (CEN/1) against
H1 : 1b (DEC/1) > 1b (CEN/1). The result of these tests are
indicated by appropriate signs between the columns of Table 6.
Result 9. For λ = 1 and λ = 0.75, the effectiveness of punishment
on contributions only differs significantly between institutions for
positive deviators. For λ = 0.50, it differs significantly for negative
deviators.
4. DISCUSSION
We test whether centralization of punishment per se under perfect
and imperfect information affects behavior and outcomes in
voluntary contribution public good games. Both, institution and
noisiness of signals are imposed exogenously, and efficiency and
cost of punishment are held constant across institutions.
We find significant differences in how contribution behavior
is being punished. While centralized authorities do not
14 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis.
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TABLE 6 | Difference in change in contributions after punishment vs. no punishment.
λ = 1 λ = 0.75 λ = 0.50
DEC CEN DEC CEN DEC CEN
1below 2.535*** 2.338*** 2.040*** 2.222*** 1.101** ≻ −0.036
1equal 1.294* −0.355 −0.236 −2.159* 3.373 1.762*
1above −0.480 ≪ 3.078*** 0.166 < 1.747*** 1.191** −0.006
Coefficients and Wald-tests based on results from Table 5. For example: ∆ below = (below & punished)-(below & not pun.). ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. Significance of
differences between institutions: ≺ (p < 0.1), < (p < 0.05),≪ (p < 0.01).
punish those who contribute more than average, we observe
such perverse and furthermore anti-social punishment in the
decentralized regime. While in treatments with noise, this
perverse punishment is being averaged out, it remains highly
relevant if signals are perfect. Otherwise we observe socially
reasonable punishment of those who contribute less than
the group average in all treatments. Similarly, distributed
and received punishment decrease with signal and actual
contribution, respectively.
Reactions to punishment by negative deviators are similar
between institutions. Even if they are not punished they increase
their contribution but punishment enhances this positive
adjustment in both institutions by about the same. Positive
deviators on the other hand, reduce their contributions in both
institutions as long as they were not punished. Interestingly,
perverse punishment by their peers has no effect on this reaction
in DEC. Thus, while perverse punishment directly induces
inefficiencies, it has hardly any consequences in the long run.
In CEN on the other hand, where this type of punishment
was not as pronounced, it has significant positive effects on
contributions.
Despite these differences in behavior, we find that the
institution has no effect, neither on contributions, aggregate
punishment nor overall efficiency, both if information is perfect
(λ = 1) and if there is considerable noise (λ = 0.5).
Under intermediate noise (λ = 0.75), however, punishment
differs significantly but with only limited consequences for
contributions and overall efficiency. More specifically, in the
peer to peer punishment institution, punishment escalates
during the first third of the experiment keeping contributions
higher than under centralized punishment. However, due
to the excessive punishment, efficiency is not significantly
different.
Anti-social and perverse punishment are frequently observed
in public good experiments with peer to peer punishment.
In a detailed study of such behavior (Herrmann et al.,
2008) suggest dominance, competitive personality, the desire
to maximize one’s relative payoff, or normative conformity
as possible motivating factors. However, there is no obvious
reason why these motivating factors should not exist among
authorities. The absence of perverse punishment in the CEN
treatments therefore suggests that the direct involvement in
the contribution stage plays an important role. Alternative
explanations such as do-gooder derogation (Monin, 2007) may,
however, still apply. Do-gooder derogation requires that one’s
own uncooperative behavior is illustrated and made worse by
the exemplary behavior of the cooperative players. As authorities
cannot contribute, they are clearly unaffected by this. Other
explanations referring to the repeated interactions, such as
counter punishment to prevent future punishment, retaliation,
or “feuds” among participants may also explain this asymmetry
among institutions. The fact that with increasing noise such
punishment behavior becomes less relevant (both in distributed
and received punishment) supports this interpretation. The
differences in reactions to perverse punishment in DEC and
CEN are another piece in the puzzle which is probably due
to ascribed motives. Centralized authorities mainly punish
cooperators if they wish them to increase their contributions
further, whereas under peer-to-peer punishment this is probably
not the reason.
What remains difficult to explain is the escalation of
punishment in DEC/0.75 which is absent in the equivalent
treatment with centralized punishment CEN/0.75. Could it be
explained by ruthless satisfaction of punishment sentiments
and expression of anger (Dickinson and Masclet, 2015)
despite the noise? But why would peers in a decentralized
punishment mechanism succumb to such behavior while
authorities do not? A possible explanation is that such
sentiments are stronger among peers. However, this raises
the question why we do not find differences between DEC/1
and CEN/1.
Centralized punishment institutions have been praised in
the economic, legal, and political science literature, with
recent support from experimental research. However, it is not
centralization per se that is beneficial but other institutional
differences. This issue carries over to studies with endogenous
institutions, where centralized punishment prevails if it comes
with additional advantages (Traulsen et al., 2012), but loses
against decentralized punishment in a ceteris paribus comparison
under perfect information (Grechenig et al., 2015).
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